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Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. *
APPEALING THE GUILTY PLEA
The defendant who enters a guilty plea may appeal his conviction and
sentence just as the defendant convicted following trial.' The critical
question is which issues are appealable following the plea of guilty. Earlier
cases held that the guilty pleas did not waive jurisdictional defects but did
waive most other complaints.2
In State v. Torres,3 following the defendant's guilty plea, the court
refused to consider the merits of his complaint concerning the failure of the
trial court to sustain a pre-trial motion to suppress. However, in State v.
Crosby,' the court distinguished Torres since in Torres, the "appeal record
did not demonstrate that the plea bargain was conditioned on the accused's
right to obtain appellate review of the constitutional invalidity of (what the
state there stipulated to be) the principal evidence" 5 against the defendant.
In Crosby, the court determined that it would not rigidly apply "the
judicially created doctrine" 6 that the guilty plea necessarily constitutes a
waiver of all but jurisdictional defects since the Code leaves the court the
flexibility to adopt procedures not in conflict with the Code.7 Thus, Crosby
creates a qualified guilty plea which preserves for appellate review certain
properly reserved pre-plea objections. The court recognized that judicial
efficiency dictates such a "sensible procedure" 8 when the trial would serve
only as an expensive method of preserving the defendant's right to urge
certain legal issues after conviction.
The sort of error envisioned is that which "represents a violation of a
constitutional or statutory right which, for reasons beyond guilt or inno-
cence, would mandate a reversal of any conviction resulting from a trial. "I
To apply these limits to such appeals, the court vests the trial judge and the
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
I. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 912; State v. Coats, 260 La. 64, 255 So.2d 75 (1971).
2. State v. Coats, 260 La. 64, 255 So.2d 75 (1971).
3. 281 So.2d 451 (La. 1973).
4. 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976).
5. Id. at 587.
6. Id. at 590.
7. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 3. See State v. Eros Cinema, Inc., 262 La. 706, 264
So.2d 615 (1972).
8. 338 So.2d at 590.
9. Id. at 591.
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district attorney with the discretion to refuse to accept a qualified guilty
plea.
With the limitations imposed by the court, the judicially created
qualified plea of guilty should provide a workable procedure. There are
many cases where the principal issue is the admissibility of certain critical
evidence. For example, when a defendant is stopped for a traffic violation
resulting in the impounding of his vehicle and consequent discovery of 1000
pounds of marijuana, the sole issue could be the validity of the seizure. If the
evidence is admissible, the defendant may see no need to go to trial.
Prior to Crosby, the defendant, following an unsuccessful motion to
suppress, could have accomplished the same result by waiving trial by
jury,' O entering into stipulations that witnesses would testify as to certain
facts, and agreeing with the district attorney to submit the case to the trial
court for a verdict. Following a guilty verdict in such case, an appeal raising
an assignment of error based on the denial of a motion to suppress would
have been permissible." The court's approach in Crosby is simply more
direct and sensible.
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE
In Louisiana, the traditional view is that as long as the sentence falls
within statutory limits, the trial court's discretion is without review.' 2 As the
reporter's comment following Code of Criminal Procedure article 878
indicates, the court has not entertained "attacks on the nature and severity of
sentences imposed unless the law upon which the conviction and sentence is
based is found unconstitutional." 13 However, in a series of recent cases the
10. LA. CONsT. art. 1, § 17; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 780.
Ii. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized such a procedure. In
United States v. Sepe, 486 F.2d 1044, aff'g 474 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1973), the court
disapproved of the use of conditional pleas of guilty, or nolo contendere to allow an
appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds (such as the trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress). See also United States v. Mizell, 488 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1973).
However, in United States v. Mendoza, 491 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the
defendants unsuccessfully moved to suppress narcotics, the defendants did not plead
guilty but followed a different procedure accomplishing substantially the same result.
Defendants and the government filed a stipulation for the trial of the defendants,
"which stipulation admitted in detail all the facts necessary to support a finding of
guilt by the district court of the charges contained in the indictment." Id. at 536. In
response to the stipulation, the trial court adjudged the accuseds guilty. They
appealed, based upon the denial of their pretrial motion to suppress. On appeal, the
court of appeals, although affirming the conviction, considered the merits of the
defendants' contentions regarding the validity of the search and seizure.
12. See State v. Pierson, 2% So.2d 324 (La. 1974).
13. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 878, comment (a).
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court discussed but avoided deciding whether it has the authority under
Article 1, Section 30 of the 1974 Constitution to review the length of
sentences imposed by trial courts.
in State v. Bryant, 14 an aggravated rape case, in a special concurrence
on rehearing, Justice Tate clearly expresses the view that the wording of
section 20 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of 1974 requires
appellate review of the appropriateness of death sentences. In his view, the
court must review the record in each case to determine whether the sentence
of death in that case is "excessive, either as for the crime charged or as
disproportionate to the crime proved." 5
The Tate concurrence certainly foreshadowed the United States Sup-
reme Court's approach in its latest round of death penalty cases. 16 The
Supreme Court clearly requires that state appellate courts review sentences
of death to determine whether the sentence is disproportionate given the
circumstances of the case and the character of the defendant. 17
In Act 694 of 1976, the Louisiana Legislature clearly mandates that the
court "shall review every sentence of death to determine if it is exces-
sive."" By employing the language of Article 1, Section 20 the legislature
arguably has recognized the possibility that Louisiana's new constitution, as
well as the federal jurisprudence, requires review of sentence at least in the
area of death sentences.
Whether the court may review the length of a particular sentence as
excessive in light of the facts and circumstances of the case is a more
difficult question. In two recent opinions 9 authored by Justice Calogero,
the court avoided decision on that issue by determining that the sentences in
question would not be considered "excessive" even if the court had the
authority to decide that they were.
In two other cases, 20 the court avoided the issue on procedural grounds
without reaching the fundamental question. In State v. Anthony2' and State
14. 325 So.2d 255 (La. 1976).
15. Id. at 267.
16. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S.Ct. 3001 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 96 S.Ct.
2950 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976).
17. See note 16, supra.
18. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.9.
19. State v. McClinton, 329 So.2d 676 (La. 1976); State v. Whitehurst, 319 So.2d
907 (La. 1975).
20. State v. Anthony, 332 So.2d 214 (La. 1976); State v. Williams, 322 So.2d 177
(La. 1975).
21. 332 So.2d 214 (La. 1976).
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v. Williams22 the defendants challenged for the first time on appeal the
length of their sentences on the ground that the sentences were excessive
under the circumstances. In both cases, the court found that the failure to
object at the time of sentence as required by article 841 precluded deciding
whether the sentences constituted an excessive penalty. Even if the court
can review the length of sentence, an "excessive" sentence is not an "error
discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and
without inspection of the evidence." '2 3 Thus, without contemporaneous
objection 24 at sentencing and assignment of error, the issue is not before the
court.
If the court decides that it has the authority and duty to review the
length of sentences, 25 the record on which such complaints are to be
reviewed will become a serious problem. Where there has been a trial, the
circumstances of the offense will presumably have been presented by the
testimony of witnesses. But the defendant's character may not have been
placed at issue and little information on that critical issue may appear. In
cases of guilty pleas, there will normally be no record regarding the
character and propensities of the offender or the circumstances of the
offense. There could be no basis in many cases for determining whether or
not a sentence is excessive in the absence of a presentence report unless
some sort of sentencing hearing is held. Under present law presentence
investigations are not required in all cases 26 and, when conducted, their
contents are not available to the defense. 27 If appellate review of sentencing
is to be meaningful, access to presentence reports under court-controlled
conditions will be necessary. If a sentencing hearing is required, the
guidelines for such hearings must of necessity be delineated by the court in
the absence of legislation. As in the case of the capital sentencing hear-
ings,28 some guidance must be given regarding the rules of evidence to be
applied and the manner in which they are to be conducted.
If the court decides that Article I, Section 20 requires some form of
review of the length of sentences, either appellate or supervisory, the writer
urges the court to consider the extensive exercise of its rulemaking powers
to create the review procedure.
22. 322 So.2d 177 (La. 1975).
23. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 920(2).
24. Id. art. 841.
25. Some authorities have written that they do. See Hargrave, The Declaration
of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1,63 (1974); Jenkins,
The Declaration of Rights, 21 LoY. L. REV. 9, 38 (1975).
26. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 875; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
27. Id. art 877; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
28. Id. art. 905.
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APPEAL-DEATH OF THE DEFENDANT
In State v. Morris ,29 the court held that the death of the defendant
during the pendency of the appeal results in vacation of the conviction and
dismissal of the indictment. Acknowledging the issue as res nova, the court
adopted what it termed the majority view.30 The logic supporting the court's
position is compelling since the aims 31 of the criminal law are really not
served by affirming a conviction and sentence when the defendant has died.
The court felt that a reversal requiring remand for a new trial could not
conceivably result in a new trial, and the prosecution would ultimately be
dismissed; even an affirmance would not result in the sentence being
satisfied. Little would be accomplished by completion of the appellate
process. Judicial efficiency dictates that the court's time not be spent on
such litigation solely for the purpose of resolving the issues presented.
Accepting the need to dismiss the appeal, the court rejected the state's
claim of mootness because of the surviving family's "interest in preserving
unstained, the memory of the deceased defendant or his reputation.' '32 With
deference, the writer feels that any harm done by conviction is irreparable
and that dismissal of the prosecution due solely to the defendant's death
does little to preserve the family's memory of the defendant. The issues can
be posed more directly. The court should not resolve the merits of defend-
ant's claim for the reasons discussed. Thus, a question of basic fairness
arises. The defendant has lost his life and the appeal must be dismissed for
reasons of judicial economy. In losing his life, he should not also forfeit his
appeal.
The court creates a sort of judicial pardon as a result of the defendant's
death following conviction but prior to the completion of appellate litiga-
tion. This is a clear, practical, and just view.
The logic of the decision may indicate similar results in other contexts.
If the defendant's death occurs after conviction but prior to sentence, or after
29. 328 So.2d 65 (La. 1976).
30. See Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 462, 496 (1966); Annot., 83 A.L.R. 2d 864 (1962).
31. The court said: "The purposes for enforcement of criminal laws are the
punishment and reform of the guilty and the protection of the public; the removal of
the defendant by death prevents the execution of any sentence in furtherance of these
objectives. Further consideration of such a case by the courts is pointless because an
affirmance of the conviction would not enable the State to execute the judgment
against the deceased. A decision of the appeal would not necessarily produce a
vindication of the defendant; appellate disposition, even if reversible error is found,
does not guarantee a judgment of acquittal. Often, the appeal results only in a new
trial, for which the deceased would be unavailable." 328 So.2d at 67.
32. Id.
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sentence but prior to appeal, arguably the same result should follow. The
trial court's approach should be the same as the appellate court's. Where the
defendant dies prior to sentence, or prior to appeal, the trial court, to be
consistent with what appears to be the theory of Morris, should grant a new
trial and dismiss the prosecution.
Whether the court's approach will be the same when the question is
presented in connection with an application for supervisory writs or in
connection with collateral attacks on convictions is questionable. However,
after writs have been granted by the supreme court, the result may be the
same since the court has agreed to hear the case. The same reasons of
judicial efficiency dictate no resolution of the merits. 33
STATE'S RIGHT To APPEAL PRETRIAL ORDERS
The Code of Criminal Procedure outlines several types of adverse
judgments from which the state may appeal.' Under the Constitution of
1921, this article was read in light of the constitutional limitations on the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Louisiana. 35 Thus, although
article 912B purported to permit state appeals from all judgments quashing
indictments such was never the case. 36 Under Article VII, Section 10 of the
1921 Constitution, there was no such right of appeal by the state in
misdemeanor cases unless the motion to quash was based on a ruling
declaring a state statute unconstitutional .3 Thus, it has always been neces-
sary to read article 912B against the constitution's limitations on the court's
appellate jurisdiction.
In State v. James ,38 without either party raising the issue, the court
found similar but even more extensive limitations on its appellate jurisdic-
tion in Article V, Section 5 of the 1974 Constitution. The court noted that it
has appellate jurisdiction where the defendant has been convicted of a
felony, or, in misdemeanor cases, where a fine exceeding $500 or imprison-
ment exceeding six months has actually been imposed. The court noted that
the constitution gives the legislature of Louisiana a free hand to expand the
defendant's rights to appeal to the supreme court. 39
33. But if the state files with the court a certified death certificate in opposition to
the granting of writs, the writer cannot discern whether the logic of Moms dictates
denial of writs, leaving the conviction intact, or granting of writs and summary
reversal to dismiss charges.
34. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 912.
35. See State v. Murphy, 254 La. 873, 227 So.2d 915 (1969).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 329 So.2d 713 (La. 1976).
39. LA. CONsT. art. V, § 5E.
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In James, the court pointed to the absence of any other provision
authorizing state appeals, or authorizing the legislature to expand the state's
right to appeal. As in the prior constitution, there is a specific provision
allowing the state to appeal a ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional.'
Justice Tate, joined by Chief Justice Sanders and Justice Dennis, felt
that the language of the constitution does not "prohibit the legislature from
affording appellate review when sought by the state of pretrial rulings
dismissing a prosecution.'"41 The language relied on by the majority does
not, in their view, require that "the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this
court shall consist of the mandatory appellate review thereby provided." 42
The impact of James is to relegate the state to applications for
supervisory review under Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution. James
does not deal with the kinds of matters to be considered reviewable, only
with the manner of seeking review. It may not be of great practical
significance that James generally leaves the state only the right to seek
discretionary writs rather than the right of appeal, since this has always been
the state's remedy when a motion to suppress is sustained.43 The writer is
confident that the court carefully considers such matters upon the state's
pretrial application. The critical determination in James may be the court's
view that the constitution provides the exclusive parameters of its appellate
jurisdiction with only such legislative flexibility as is specifically provided
in the constitution.
40. Id. art. V, § 5(D)(1).
41. 329 So.2d at 717 (Emphasis supplied by the court). The opinion of Justice
Tate was a concurring opinion since the court considered the state's contentions in
view of their treatment of the appeal as an application for writs.
42. Id. at 718. It is noteworthy that Justices Tate and Dennis were both delegates
to the constitutional convention.
43. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 703, comment (g).
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